Evolutionary Game Analysis of Government Regulation on Green Innovation Behavior Decision-Making of Energy Enterprises

Abstract

Encouraging environmentally friendly innovation in energy companies is an essential way to stop global warming. Through ingenious integration of reputation and fairness preference, this research develops an evolutionary game model between the government and energy companies. This research investigates the dynamic evolution of green innovation strategy selection by energy firms operating under government supervision, using an evolutionary game model as a basis. This study examines how government regulations, including their subsidies and penalties, reputation, and fairness preference, affect the green innovation behavior of energy enterprises. The research shows that without considering the fairness preference, the subsidy and punishment of government regulation can improve the tendency of energy enterprises to choose green innovation behavior. At the same time, considering the reputation of energy enterprises to assume social responsibility can improve the tendency of energy enterprises to choose green innovation behavior. In the case of considering fairness preference, energy companies with strong fairness preference are more likely not to adopt green innovation and need more subsidies and penalties to choose green innovation; energy enterprises with weak fairness preference are more likely to adopt green innovation; green innovation will take place with fewer subsidies and penalties; reputation plays a stronger role in energy companies with weak fairness preferences. The study can give the government a theoretical foundation on which to build precise regulatory plans for various energy firms and encourage green innovation in those enterprises.