A Risk Management Strategy under Transfer Pricing for Multi-National Supply Chain along the Belt and Road Initiative

Abstract

The “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI) drives international trade more and more frequently, making exchange rates and taxes unavoidable issues for multi-national companies. Thus, exchange risk uncertainty and tax saving planning should be considered in the operational decisions of a multi-national supply chain. This paper constructs a Stackelberg game model with four composite modes to explore the risk-taking and hedging strategy of retailers with reference-dependent psychology. The results show that: (1) exchange rate risk is transmitted through all subjects under the cost-plus transfer pricing strategy, while it is transmitted only between headquarters and retailers under the resale-price transfer pricing strategy. (2) No matter which subject bears the exchange rate risk, the motivation is stronger under the resale-price transfer pricing strategy. (3) The effect of futures hedging exchange rate risk is influenced by retailer reference-dependent psychology. When the reference dependence coefficient is low, and the risk of positive exchange rate fluctuations is too high, the retailer chooses to hedge its exchange rate risk. At this time, the transfer pricing strategy should shift to cost-plus, and the exchange rate fluctuation range that each entity can afford is larger than before hedging.