Rowhammer Attacks in Dynamic Random-Access Memory and Defense Methods
Author:
Kim Dayeon1, Park Hyungdong1, Yeo Inguk1, Lee Youn Kyu1ORCID, Kim Youngmin2ORCID, Lee Hyung-Min3ORCID, Kwon Kon-Woo1ORCID
Affiliation:
1. Department of Computer Engineering, Hongik University, Seoul 04066, Republic of Korea 2. School of Electronic and Electrical Engineering, Hongik University, Seoul 04066, Republic of Korea 3. School of Electrical Engineering, Korea University, Seoul 02841, Republic of Korea
Abstract
This paper provides a comprehensive overview of the security vulnerability known as rowhammer in Dynamic Random-Access Memory (DRAM). While DRAM offers many desirable advantages, including low latency, high density, and cost-effectiveness, rowhammer vulnerability, first identified in 2014, poses a significant threat to computing systems. Rowhammer attacks involve repetitive access to specific DRAM rows, which can cause bit flips in neighboring rows, potentially compromising system credentials, integrity, and availability. The paper discusses the various stages of rowhammer attacks, explores existing attack techniques, and examines defense strategies. It also emphasizes the importance of understanding DRAM organization and the associated security challenges.
Funder
Military Crypto Research Center Defense Acquisition Program Administration Agency for Defense Development Ministry of Science and ICT National Research Foundation of Korea Hongik University
Subject
Electrical and Electronic Engineering,Biochemistry,Instrumentation,Atomic and Molecular Physics, and Optics,Analytical Chemistry
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