Window Dressing in Impression Management: Does Negative Media Coverage Drive Corporate Green Production?

Abstract

This study addresses the calls for research attention on corporate greenwashing and analyzes an environmental strategy in corporate impression management. We assume that negative media coverage triggers impression motivation and causes firms to adopt environmental strategies for impression construction based on the two-component model in impression management. Specifically, firms release credible signals, such as green investment, to cover concealed pollution emissions under the framework of a game with incomplete information. We posit that firms can select a window-dressing strategy under the pressures of negative media coverage by constructing two regression models, respectively. We also assess our underlying assumption of constraints from state ownership and institutional shareholdings by testing additional moderating relationships. Utilizing a sample of Chinese publicly listed firms from 2000 to 2010, our empirical results suggest that negative media coverage increases corporate green investment, but pollutant emissions are reduced correspondingly, and state ownership aggravates corporate window dressing while institutional shareholdings curb it. Our findings reveal the corporate social irresponsibility in environmental protection and sustainable development, and they offer important implications for firm stakeholders.