A More Realistic Markov Process Model for Explaining the Disjunction Effect in One-Shot Prisoner’s Dilemma Game

Abstract

The quantum model has been considered to be advantageous over the Markov model in explaining irrational behaviors (e.g., the disjunction effect) during decision making. Here, we reviewed and re-examined the ability of the quantum belief–action entanglement (BAE) model and the Markov belief–action (BA) model in explaining the disjunction effect considering a more realistic setting. The results indicate that neither of the two models can truly represent the underlying cognitive mechanism. Thus, we proposed a more realistic Markov model to explain the disjunction effect in the prisoner’s dilemma game. In this model, the probability transition pattern of a decision maker (DM) is dependent on the information about the opponent’s action, Also, the relationship between the cognitive components in the evolution dynamics is moderated by the DM’s degree of subjective uncertainty (DSN). The results show that the disjunction effect can be well predicted by a more realistic Markov model. Model comparison suggests the superiority of the proposed Markov model over the quantum BAE model in terms of absolute model performance, relative model performance, and model flexibility. Therefore, we suggest that the key to successfully explaining the disjunction effect is to consider the underlying cognitive mechanism properly.