Visual/Inertial/GNSS Integrated Navigation System under GNSS Spoofing Attack

Abstract

Visual/Inertial/GNSS (VIG) integrated navigation and positioning systems are widely used in unmanned vehicles and other systems. This VIG system is vulnerable to of GNSS spoofing attacks. Relevant research on the harm that spoofing causes to the system and performance analyses of VIG systems under GNSS spoofing are not sufficient. In this paper, an open-source VIG algorithm, VINS-Fusion, based on nonlinear optimization, is used to analyze the performance of the VIG system under a GNSS spoofing attack. The influence of the visual inertial odometer (VIO) scale estimation error and the transformation matrix deviation in the transition period of spoofing detection is analyzed. Deviation correction methods based on the GNSS-assisted scale compensation coefficient estimation method and optimal pose transformation matrix selection are proposed for VIG-integrated system in spoofing areas. For an area that the integrated system can revisit many times, a global pose map-matching method is proposed. An outfield experiment with a GNSS spoofing attack is carried out in this paper. The experiment result shows that, even if the GNSS measurements are seriously affected by the spoofing, the integrated system still can run independently, following the preset waypoint. The scale compensation coefficient estimation method, the optimal pose transformation matrix selection method and the global pose map-matching method can depress the estimation error under the circumstances of a spoofing attack.