Estimating Interception Density in the BB84 Protocol: A Study with a Noisy Quantum Simulator

Abstract

Quantum computers have the potential to break the public-key cryptosystems widely used in key exchange and digital signature applications. To address this issue, quantum key distribution (QKD) offers a robust countermeasure against quantum computer attacks. Among various QKD schemes, BB84 is the most widely used and studied. However, BB84 implementations are inherently imperfect, resulting in quantum bit error rates (QBERs) even in the absence of eavesdroppers. Distinguishing between QBERs caused by eavesdropping and QBERs due to channel imperfections is fundamentally infeasible. In this context, this paper proposes and examines a practical method for detecting eavesdropping via partial intercept-and-resend attacks in the BB84 protocol. A key feature of the proposed method is its consideration of quantum system noise. The efficacy of this method is assessed by employing the Quantum Solver library in conjunction with backend simulators inspired by real quantum machines that model quantum system noise. The simulation outcomes demonstrate the method’s capacity to accurately estimate the eavesdropper’s interception density in the presence of system noise. Moreover, the results indicate that the estimation accuracy of the eavesdropper’s interception density in the presence of system noise is dependent on both the actual interception density value and the key length.