Affiliation:
1. Faculty of Computation Mathematics and Cybernetics, Moscow State University, 119991 Moscow, Russia
2. Higher School of Economics, University in Moscow, 109028 Moscow, Russia
Abstract
In previous papers of the authors, a generalized evolutionary approach was developed for the analysis of popular inspection and corruption games. Namely, a two-level hierarchy was studied, where a local inspector I of a pool of agents (that may break the law) can be corrupted and is further controlled by the higher authority A. Here, we extend this two-level modeling by answering the following questions: (i) what levels of illegal profit r of violators and what level of bribes α (fraction of illegal profit asked as a bribe from a violator) of an inspector are feasible, that is, realizable in stable equilibria of generalized replicator dynamics; and (ii) what α can be optimal for a corrupted inspector that aims at maximizing the total profit. Concrete settings that we have in mind are illegal logging, the sales of products with substandard quality, and tax evasion.
Funder
Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Russian Federation
Subject
General Mathematics,Engineering (miscellaneous),Computer Science (miscellaneous)
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