Abstract
In the post-epidemic era, the e-commerce industry has become an important engine to promote the new round of growth in China’s economy. However, the frequent quality problems of products, such as shoddy goods and improper products in the market, not only violate the legitimate rights and interests of consumers and social and public interests, but also seriously restrict the steady and sound development of the e-commerce industry. This paper uses evolutionary game theory to build an evolutionary game model between the government, platform, and merchants, and it analyzes the stable evolution path of the game system and the key factors affecting product quality optimization under the situation of dual strategy set, and then it expands the game side strategy set into a continuous type and compares and explores the regulatory effects and quality output changes under the two situations. Then, it puts forward effective measures to improve the quality of e-commerce products. The findings are as follows: in the case of a binary strategy set, it is difficult for merchants to steadily evolve towards compliance management, while merchants’ violation management only has the willingness to improve their efforts when the scale of consumers is small. In the case of continuous policy set, government–enterprise cooperative supervision can realize the compliance operation of merchants, and the effort level and income of merchants are consistent with the optimal value in the case of dual policy set. The results show that the government and e-commerce platforms should adhere to the concept of dynamic regulation and adjust the regulatory strategies according to the different development stages of enterprises so as to not only give merchants sufficient development space, but also to maintain the healthy development environment of the market. At the same time, the government and e-commerce platforms should also avoid the binary choice of supervision or neglect, adopt flexible regulatory strategies, and maintain moderate flexible regulation so as to achieve the development trend of compliance, efforts, and profits of merchants.
Funder
BUPT Excellent Ph.D. Students Foundation of the Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications
Subject
Computer Science Applications,General Business, Management and Accounting
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