Influence Mechanism and Evolutionary Game of Environmental Regulation on Green Port Construction

Abstract

Ports are not only an important driving force for the growth of the world economy but also the main energy-consuming unit and pollution source in the world. Under the new global energy crisis and environmental deterioration situation, the international port community has put forward the concept of green port development. As a guide, the government’s environmental regulation strategy can directly affect green port construction through market incentive or command control means and can also indirectly affect green port construction through the intermediary role of green innovation, industrial agglomeration and green logistics. Considering the strategic choices of the government, port enterprises and transportation enterprises, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model and considers whether the government carrying out environmental regulation is affected by the fine income and management cost, whether the willingness of port enterprises to carry out green port construction is determined by the extra construction cost and income and whether transportation enterprises choose green port logistics transportation depending on the extra income they receive. In the process of tripartite cooperation, the government’s environmental regulation, port enterprises’ green port construction and transportation enterprises’ choice of the green port logistics transportation mode constitute the most ideal strategy combination. Finally, the paper puts forward some suggestions for the strategy selection of the three parties in order to promote the realization of the ideal strategy combination and provide a theoretical reference for the construction of green ports.