Abstract
In this paper, we show that Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory with Choice (ZFC) conflicts with basic intuitions about randomness. Our background assumptions are the Zermelo–Fraenekel axioms without Choice (ZF) together with a fragment of Kolmogorov’s probability theory. Using these minimal assumptions, we prove that a weak form of Choice contradicts two common sense assumptions about probability—both based on simple notions of symmetry and independence.
Subject
Physics and Astronomy (miscellaneous),General Mathematics,Chemistry (miscellaneous),Computer Science (miscellaneous)
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