The Positive Motivation of Shame: Moral Emotion in the Mencius

Abstract

For Mencius, shame is the human way of existing in a virtuous disposition and concretely manifests not only as the self-affirming of the passion of shame in the action of stopping something bad from happening, but also as a way of handling affairs and processing things. This paper explains how shame functions as moral motivation by analyzing the affective mindset of shame and aversion (xiu e zhi xin 羞恶之心) and its relation to honoring decorum (yi 义) in the Mencius. Furthermore, I clarify that shame not only refers to cases of shameful self-concern but also to cases of morally detesting others and that the object of both is honoring decorum (yi 义). This unique psychological affect that we call shame develops from the dissonance or misalignment between one’s own moral conduct and the criteria of socially beneficial interaction; however, for this reason, it is commonly misinterpreted as negative. In order to demonstrate the positivity of shame and lay out the moral groundwork for an ethics of shame, this paper unfolds the complex interrelation between honoring decorum (yi 义) and shame. Lastly, this paper argues that shame is a deeply-rooted natural disposition that grows and expands in connection with self-approved norms during interactions with other people; therefore, it is the unfolding of a coherence between affect and norm and a relational moral emotion that takes us beyond the symmetry and asymmetry of utilitarian and deontological ethics, respectively.