Duopoly Price Competition in Wireless Sensor Network-Based Service Provision

Abstract

The Internet of Things (IoT) is emerging as a new communication paradigm and has attracted a significant amount of attention from both academic and engineering communities. In this paper, we consider an IoT market where three roles exist: Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs), two service providers (SPs) and end users. The WSNs are responsible for sensing and providing data to the two SPs. Based on the sensed data from WSNs, the two SPs compete to provide services to the end users. We model the relationship between the two SPs and end users as a two-stage Stackelberg game, where the two SPs set the prices for their services firstly, and then the end users decide which SP to choose. Specifically, we consider two price-competition scenarios of the two SPs, which are engaged in two games, one is a noncooperative strategic game (NSG) where the two SPs set the prices for services simultaneously, the other is a Stackelberg game (SG) where SP1 who sets the price first is the leader and SP2 who sets the price after is the follower. Each user decides whether and which SP to purchase services from based on prices and service rates. An equilibrium is achieved in each of the two scenarios. Numerical results are conducted to verify our theoretical analysis.