Contract Farming and Food Insecurity in an Open Competitive Economy: Growth, Distribution, and Government Policy

Abstract

The paper explores the emergence and consequence of contract farming as a new subsector of agriculture in a small open developing economy, applying the theory of finite change in a general equilibrium framework. In this paper, we analyze the entry of a cash crop-producing foreign contract farming (CF) subsector within the agricultural sector of a country. Entry requires a cash crop price that is substantially above the price of the food crop already being produced within the country. CF (a) increases GDP and hence aggregate economic welfare; (b) may make income distribution more skewed; (c) reduces domestic production of food and hence, (d) increases food import and hence food insecurity. Thus, CF might imply a trade-off between inequality and growth. We employ a variant of the 3 × 3 mixed specific factor-Heckscher Ohlin general equilibrium model of production and trade where introduction of a new policy may lead to the emergence of a new sector resulting in finite changes where we show the possibilities of sectoral diversification with combinations of contract farming vis-à-vis traditional agriculture under some plausible conditions. Our results seem to be consistent when compared to some empirically robust conclusions found in the literature and some secondary data available on the FAO website. We also argue that the food insecurity problem gets aggravated as more and more countries engage in contract farming. Policy simulations identify critical parameters confirming the dominance of distribution over the growth effect in terms of a social welfare function. Simulations imply that there could be a food insecurity problem, as rises in GDP could result in increasing inequality so that government—to preserve social welfare—could restrict the extent of contract farming if non-food-producing sectors expand, causing terms-of-trade deterioration of food-importing nations.