Game Analysis of the Evolution of Energy Structure Transition Considering Low-Carbon Sentiment of the Decision-Makers in the Context of Carbon Neutrality

Abstract

Countries have started to aggressively undertake energy structure transformation strategies in order to reach the objective of carbon neutrality. Both clean and efficient coal energy use and clean energy use will be crucial to the process of changing the energy structure since the two cannot be totally replaced within a short period of time. In this study, we quantify emotions as an irrational factor, combine them with an evolutionary game using RDEU theory, and build an evolutionary game model between government regulators and energy consumers. We then analyze how low-carbon emotions of decision-makers affect their choice of strategy and the transformation of the energy structure. The findings support that by affecting the relative importance of each strategic choice, emotions have a profound impact on the evolutionary steady state of the system. Appropriate stress and anxiety can increase decision-makers’ feelings of responsibility, while pleasant emotions frequently support strategic conduct. The main countermeasures are as follows: Allow government regulators and energy consumers to properly release positive information, with government regulators forming subsidies and energy consumers actively cooperating and promoting low-carbon activities. This will properly guide the low-carbon sentiment of game subjects to keep them realistically pessimistic.