Decision Boundary of Knowledge Sharing between Innovation Alliance Firms

Abstract

Knowledge sharing can improve the efficiency of cooperation between firms as well as improve innovation performance. However, firms will incur some costs in the process of participating in knowledge sharing. Based on the theory of Stackelberg, by constructing corporate game models with and without knowledge sharing, this study analyzes the decision boundary of firms according to the benefit changes of firms with innovation alliances. Cooperative game theory is mainly used to solve the problem of benefit distribution. Shapley value is the most classic and fair benefit distribution method in this theory, which allocates cooperative benefit based on the marginal contribution. This study uses Shapley value to divide benefits so as to evaluate the stability of the alliance and explore when firms will share knowledge. The results show that the cooperation benefit of innovation alliances that meet the conditions for the knowledge sharing cost will increase. The lower the costs of knowledge sharing, the more the firms’ benefits increase. In addition, with knowledge sharing, the better the marketing effect is, the higher is the price of the new product. Increasing the benefits to each firm ensures the stability and continuity of knowledge sharing between the firms. Finally, the reliability of the theoretical research findings is assessed through a numerical example.