The Evolution of Behavioral Strategies in the Game Theory Context of National Park Management: A Comparison of Central and Local Government Objectives

Abstract

To address the complexities of national park management within China, this study investigated the evolutionary game between central and local governments in the context of Sanjiangyuan National Park, to explore strategic behavior and goal displacement issues. This research dissected the interplay and strategy evolution between governmental levels, considering the diverse interests, policy interpretations, and resource allocations that often lead to strategic misalignments. Employing an evolutionary game theory framework, we integrated a literature review and numerical simulations to delineate the dynamics of central–local governmental interactions. Our results underscore the pivotal role of strategic alignment in ensuring ecological conservation and socioeconomic development. The findings reveal that under certain conditions, characterized by minimization of rent-seeking behavior, cost-effective management, and risk mitigation, an evolutionarily stable strategy promoting optimal park management can emerge. This study concludes that a cooperative framework, underpinned by aligned incentives and strategic coherence between governmental levels, is critical for sustainable management of national parks. It contributes to understanding of governance models in national parks, offers insights into policy formulation and implementation within the ongoing environmental reform initiatives in China, reveals the behavioral strategies within national park management systems, and supports policy recommendations for enhancing governance quality and management efficiency.