Research on Decision Optimization of Supply Chain Quality Information Disclosure Considering Stigma Level

Abstract

With the frequent occurrence of online public opinion events, the problem of product stigma is becoming increasingly serious. Enterprises must use effective quality information disclosure strategies to reduce losses affecting market sales and profit. Therefore, this paper aims to address the supply chain structure composed of one product manufacturer and one component manufacturer under the influence of stigma. It constructs a decision optimization model under three scenarios: no information disclosure, the product manufacturer disclosures information, and the component manufacturer disclosures information, and uses Stackelberg game theory to solve and analyze the model. Furthermore, we use numerical examples to verify the model results, and provide management suggestions for enterprises. The research results show that enterprises suffering from product stigma should actively implement information disclosure strategies to reduce their profit losses, and the lower the stigma level, the better the effect of information disclosure will be; when the stigma level becomes more serious, enterprises should take timely steps to reduce the sales price of products, the sales price of components, and the efforts to disclose information; for industries that value confidentiality of product information, although the implementation of information disclosure by the component manufacturer can require less effort for information disclosure, the two enterprises will suffer higher economic losses.