A Study on the Design of Incentive Contracts for Platform Economy Regulation Based on Dual Principal–Agents

Abstract

A system of incentives can be established to encourage several parties to unite as a community of interest and become jointly committed to the platform economic governance. The platform economy involves progressively more complex subjects of interest and relationships, which are not the typical principal–agent one-time cooperative relationship. This study investigates the problem of regulatory incentives in the platform economy, specifically focusing on the relationship between the government, platform enterprises, and merchants. It analyzes this issue under conditions of asymmetric information by constructing and solving a dual principal–agent model. The findings indicate the following: (1) the government’s incentives and regulatory mechanisms can be considered as interchangeable to some extent, with decisions made by evaluating their respective costs; (2) the government’s optimal incentives and regulations ultimately shape the self-regulatory behavior of merchants through platform enterprises; and (3) the optimal level of incentives for both the government and the platform enterprise is influenced by factors such as the ability coefficient, the social transformation coefficient, and the merchants’ reliance on the platform enterprise. Additionally, the optimal effort level of the platform enterprise and the merchants increases with higher levels of the regulatory effort, risk sensitivity coefficient, and ability coefficient. A win–win scenario and a long-term, stable cooperative partnership can be reached by the three parties under the ideal incentive intensity. The study’s conclusions can serve as a theoretical foundation and support for the creation of incentive contracts for platform economy regulation.