Why Do Key Decision-Makers Fail to Foresee Extreme ‘Black Swan’ Events? A Case Study of the Pike River Mine Disaster, New Zealand

Abstract

This research addresses the strategic issue of why key decision-makers fail to foresee potential extreme ‘black swan’ events. Following a review of the literature, a conceptual framework is developed that identifies two types of organisational blindness that are reflected in Tetlock’s hedgehog cognitive thinking style, being the oversimplification of uncertainty (e.g., inductive biases) and an unquestioned, top-down, reference narrative. This framework is tested using a case study approach and qualitative analysis of secondary data sources available from the Royal Commission of Inquiry and other published reports following the 2010 methane explosion at the Pike River Coal Ltd.’s mine (Pike) in New Zealand, that killed 29 miners and caused the loss of all funds invested. The results indicate that the combined effect of both blindnesses meant that Pike’s collective intelligence was limited, and for the three key decision-makers at the Pike River mine, some type of extreme ‘black swan’ event was apparently inevitable. This research provides theoretical and practical contributions to the analysis of business and public policy decision-making under uncertainty.