Affiliation:
1. School of Management Engineering, Zhengzhou University of Aeronautics, Zhengzhou 450046, China
2. School of Maritime Economics and Management, Dalian Maritime University, Dalian 116026, China
Abstract
This paper explores the logistics strategy selection of a manufacturer that uses two sales channels (resale and agency channels) to sell the same product through an E-commerce platform. The agency channel offers two logistic strategies, low-quality logistics services provided by third-party enterprises (Strategy N) and high-quality logistics services provided by the platform (Strategy S). When the manufacturer opts for Strategy S, a portion of the market share of the resale channel shifts to the agency channel, which results in the platform logistics effect. We developed a game-theoretic model to investigate the equilibrium results of a manufacturer under different logistics strategies. The results show that there exists a threshold for the platform logistics effect. When the platform logistics effect is lower than this threshold, the manufacturer prefers Strategy N. Otherwise, the manufacturer prefers Strategy S. However, when the platform logistics price reaches a certain level, the manufacturer will always prefer Strategy N. Our study provides valuable insights for manufacturers and e-commerce platforms to optimize their operational decisions based on different logistics strategies. It also helps manufacturers make rational choices about logistics strategies.
Funder
the General Project of Humanities and Social Sciences Research in Henan Province
Subject
Information Systems and Management,Computer Networks and Communications,Modeling and Simulation,Control and Systems Engineering,Software
Cited by
1 articles.
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