How Can the Sustainable Motivational Effect of Equity Incentives on Corporate Performance Be Exploited?—A Study Based on the Moderating Effect of Aspiration Level
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Published:2022-12-09
Issue:24
Volume:14
Page:16485
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ISSN:2071-1050
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Container-title:Sustainability
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language:en
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Short-container-title:Sustainability
Author:
Tang Lu,Zhang Shihan,Ding Chenhui,Huan Jinyao
Abstract
How equity incentives affect corporate performance has become a consensus. However, the question of how to maximize the sustainable incentive effect of equity incentives on corporate performance and avoid “short-sighted” behavior under equity incentives has not yet been resolved. This research re-examines the sustainable incentive of equity incentives and examines the moderating role of aspiration levels based on the behavioral theory of the firm and the prospect theory. Applying panel data comprised 9588 observations from Chinese A-share listed companies spanning the period from 2011 to 2019, this study found that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between equity incentives and corporate performance. Aspiration surplus negatively moderates the curvilinear inverted U-shaped relationship. As the level of aspiration surplus changes from low to high, the curvilinear relationship between equity incentives and corporate performance is weakened. Aspiration loss positively moderates the curvilinear inverted U-shaped relationship. As the level of aspiration loss changes from low to high, the curvilinear relationship between equity incentives and corporate performance is enhanced. This study demonstrates the importance of aspiration level between equity incentives and corporate performance, guiding firms to focus on the implementation scenario as an influencing factor in order to improve the sustainable incentive effect of equity incentives.
Funder
National Social Science Foundation of China Late Grant Project: Research on Digital Economy Enabling High Quality Development and Industrialization of Manufacturing Industry
Subject
Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law,Renewable Energy, Sustainability and the Environment,Geography, Planning and Development,Building and Construction
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