Understanding the Complex Adaptive Characteristics of Cross-Regional Emergency Collaboration in China: A Stochastic Evolutionary Game Approach

Abstract

Regional integration and pairing assistance are two forms of cross-regional emergency collaboration practice carried out by the Chinese government. Based on the Chinese government’s emergency management practice, evolutionary game models of cross-regional emergency collaboration were constructed. Further, the traditional evolutionary game model was improved by introducing the stochastic process, and Gaussian white noise was introduced as a random disturbance. The stochastic evolutionary game model was constructed, and the existence and stability of the equilibrium solutions of the two kinds of stochastic evolutionary game systems for cross-regional emergency collaboration were verified based on the stability discrimination theorem of stochastic differential equations. We used numerical simulations to simulate the evolution trajectories of the regional integration and the pairing assistance stochastic evolutionary game system. In the regional integration game system, when the efficiency of emergency collaboration, the emergency capital stock, and the externality coefficients are higher, positive emergency strategies are more likely to become the stable state of the game subjects’ strategy selection. In the pairing assistance game system, the efficiency of emergency collaboration, the rewards and benefits from the central government, and the matching degree between governments all had positive effects on the formation of the positive emergency strategies of the game subjects. In addition, the pairing assistance mechanism for sustainable development requires external support from the central government.