Understanding Dynamics and Bifurcation Control Mechanism for a Fractional-Order Delayed Duopoly Game Model in Insurance Market

Abstract

Recently, the insurance industry in China has been greatly developed. The number of domestic insurance companies and foreign investment insurance companies has greatly increased. Competition between different insurance companies is becoming increasingly fierce. Grasping the internal competition law of different insurance companies is a very meaningful work. In this present work, we set up a novel fractional-order delayed duopoly game model in insurance market and discuss the dynamics including existence and uniqueness, non-negativeness, and boundedness of solution for the established fractional-order delayed duopoly game model in insurance market. By selecting the delay as a bifurcation parameter, we build a new delay-independent condition ensuring the stability and creation of Hopf bifurcation of the built fractional-order delayed duopoly game model. Making use of a suitable definite function, we explore the globally asymptotic stability of the involved fractional-order delayed duopoly game model. By virtue of hybrid controller which includes state feedback and parameter perturbation, we can effectively control the stability and the time of creation of Hopf bifurcation for the involved fractional-order delayed duopoly game model. The research indicates that time delay plays an all-important role in stabilizing the system and controlling the time of onset of Hopf bifurcation of the involved fractional-order delayed duopoly game model. To check the rationality of derived primary conclusions, Matlab simulation plots are explicitly presented. The established results in this manuscript are wholly novel and own immense theoretical guiding significance in managing and operating insurance companies.