Language Recovery in Discrete-Event Systems against Sensor Deception Attacks

Abstract

Cyber-physical systems are characterized by the intrinsic combination of software and physical components that usually include (wired and wireless) communication devices, sensors, actuators, and control processing units. Some wireless devices communicate over insecure channels, rendering cyber-physical systems at risk of malicious attacks that might lead to catastrophic damage. This paper touches upon the problem of sensor deception attacks in supervisory control of discrete-event systems, where an attacker can insert, delete, or replace sensor readings to mislead the supervisor and induce system damage. We model potential attacks using nondeterministic finite-state transducers and then introduce a new defence strategy that utilizes insertion functions. Insertion functions are a type of monitoring interface that alters the system’s behaviour by adding extra observable events. Finally, we construct a nondeterministic finite-state transducer called a supervisor filter that recovers the original language generated by the plant by handling the altered language. The insertion function and the supervisor filter cooperate to control the system and confuse the intruder without confusing the supervisor.