The Board Structure and Performance in IPO Firms: Evidence from Stakeholder-Oriented Corporate Governance

Abstract

This study investigates the internal mechanisms as an important factor for shareholders and stakeholders in initial public offering (IPO) firms with stakeholder-oriented corporate governance. Over the period of 2009–2016, we examine the role of independent directors in Japanese stakeholder-oriented corporate governance. According to previous research, the monitoring role of independent directors is strengthened in countries with a market-based financial system. Our empirical analyses show that independent directors do not effectively mitigate conflicts among shareholders such as IPO underpricing in a stakeholder-oriented corporate governance framework. Alternatively, accounting expertise may contribute to mitigating IPO underpricing in accordance with U.S. corporations. The participation of bank-affiliated directors in IPO firms further contributes to the mitigation of underpricing. Accordingly, these findings imply that bank ties through Horizontal Keiretsu’s bank-appointed directors are critical for mitigating conflicts among shareholders in IPO firms. These results imply that stakeholder-oriented corporate governance systems contribute to reducing conflicts among stakeholders.