Non-Cooperative Indirect Energy Trading with Energy Storage Systems for Mitigation of Demand Response Participation Uncertainty

Abstract

This work focuses on the demand response (DR) participation using the energy storage system (ESS). A probabilistic Gaussian mixture model based on market operating results Monte, Carlo Simulation (MCS), is required to respond to an urgent DR signal. However, there is considerable uncertainty in DR forecasting, which occasionally fails to predict DR events. Because this failure is attributable to the intermittency of the DR signals, a non-cooperative game model that is useful for decision-making on DR participation is proposed. The game is conducted with each player holding a surplus of energy but incomplete information. Consequently, each player can share unused electricity during DR events, engaging in indirect energy trading (IET) under a non-cooperative game framework. The results of the game, the Nash equilibrium (N.E.), are verified using a case study with relevant analytical data from the campus of Gwangju Institute of Science and Technology (GIST) in Korea. The results of the case study show that IET is useful in mitigating the uncertainty of the DR program.