Promoting Sponge City Construction through Rainwater Trading: An Evolutionary Game Theory-Based Analysis

Abstract

Sponge city construction strategies (SCCSs) have gradually attracted increased attention because of the strong shocks to society and economies caused by extreme weather and global climate change. The development of sponge cities is consistent with the national goal, and China must support environmental sustainability. Rainwater trading (RWT) plays a key role in promoting the efficient allocation and use of rainwater resources in sponge cities. In this study, we built an evolutionary game model on the basis of 13 parameters influencing the strategy selection of game players of environmental protection enterprises (EPEs) and municipal enterprises (MEs)’ in promoting sponge city construction. Next, we discussed the interaction effect of the two players’ behaviors in the 16 cases. Finally, we used the first RWT project in an empirical simulation to analyze the critical parameters influencing the game; we provide regulation policy suggestions to achieve the final goal. The results show that sufficient financial subsidies, the reduction in additional sales, the increase in taxes, and the participation of more EPEs can accelerate the realization of the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) between EPEs and MEs. Incentive measures should focus not only on economic measures but also on reputation incentives and industry regulations. The proposed model can be used as a tool to promote the development and application of sponge cities, thus enriching the literature on promoting the communication of SCCSs. Moreover, our findings are valuable for the promotion of the use of rainwater resources, the marketization of the ecological value of rainwater resources, and the further construction of sponge cities.