A Game Analysis-Based Behavioral Interaction Framework between Governments and Innovative Enterprises for Intellectual Property Regulation Policies

Abstract

Although the Chinese government has issued and revised a series of policies and regulations on intellectual property, infringement still repeatedly occurs. China is in a critical period of economic transformation and upgrading, and the problem of intellectual property infringement is becoming increasingly prominent. Accordingly, in this study, an evolutionary game analysis-based behavioral interaction framework between innovative enterprises and local government regulators, based on evolutionary game theory, was constructed. The strategy choice of both sides of the game and the evolutionary stability of the system were analyzed, and the evolutionary path of each equilibrium point was verified by simulation. The results show that the proposed framework is complex; the dynamic evolutionary system has different evolutionary equilibrium states under different institutional environments. Profit is not the only factor affecting the behavior decision of enterprises; the behavior strategies of governments also have an effect, and the interaction is mutual. Under the government supervision mode, innovative enterprises gradually evolve into the non-infringement strategy under the pressure of external supervision. However, the policy cost of this mode is too high for it to be the optimal solution for regulatory policy. Under the mode of no government supervision, the innovation incentive policy gives enterprises the internal motivation to innovate, results in a relative reduction in the infringement income, and blocks the inducement of infringement. This can effectively control enterprise infringement to realize the sustainable development of enterprises and ultimately achieve the desired objectives of government regulatory policy.