Abstract
We introduce a mixed network coupling mechanism and study its effects on how cooperation evolves in interdependent networks. This mechanism allows some players (conservative-driven) to establish a fixed-strength coupling, while other players (radical-driven) adjust their coupling strength through the evolution of strategy. By means of numerical simulation, a hump-like relationship between the level of cooperation and conservative participant density is revealed. Interestingly, interspecies interactions stimulate polarization of the coupling strength of radical-driven players, promoting cooperation between two types of players. We thus demonstrate that a simple mixed network coupling mechanism substantially expands the scope of cooperation among structured populations.
Subject
General Physics and Astronomy
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