Abstract
Previous scholars have noted the increase in negotiated agreements as a means of resolving utility regulatory disputes in the United States. These agreements allow policy actors to make their own decisions instead of receiving orders from a regulatory agency. Through a natural gas utility case study in the state of Utah, this paper examines the Advocacy Coalition Framework’s (ACF) novel explanation of the conditions contributing to a negotiated agreement with the emergence of new energy efficiency programs. Using the ACF, coalition groupings are divided out as either those in favor of energy efficiency programs or those against that change. A content analysis explores the presence of the conditions leading to a negotiated agreement. This article finds that the ACF model provides a theoretical lens to understand negotiated agreements in utility regulation. While utility agreements resolving regulatory proceedings seem to only grow, more research opportunities exist for further study on the ACF and these outcomes in utility regulation.
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