Abstract
Online reputation systems play an important role in reducing consumers’ purchase uncertainty in online shopping. However, some sellers manipulate reviews for their own interests, which reduces the effectiveness of the reputation system. Unlike the previous studies, which focus on features of reviews and reviewers, this study establishes a game model to analyze sellers’ manipulation behavior and identifies what kind of sellers or under what scenario sellers are motivated to manipulate reviews. Our study provides a new perspective for platform to detect fake reviews and helps consumers to make good use of online reviews without getting trapped in some sellers’ fraudulent manipulation.
Funder
National Natural Science Foundation of China
Subject
Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law,Renewable Energy, Sustainability and the Environment,Geography, Planning and Development
Cited by
23 articles.
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