Affiliation:
1. Research Center of Energy Economics, School of Business Administration, Henan Polytechnic University, Jiaozuo 454003, China
Abstract
In bimatrix games with symmetric triangular fuzzy payoffs, our work defines an (α, β)-risk aversion Nash equilibrium ((α, β)-RANE) and presents its sufficient and necessary condition. Our work also discusses the relationships between the (α, β)-RANE and a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE) in a bimatrix game with a risk-averse player 2 and certain payoffs. Finally, considering 2 × 2 bimatrix games with STFPs, we find the conditions where the increase in player 2’s risk-aversion level hurts or benefits himself/herself.
Funder
Research Funds for Henan Provincial Higher Education Institutions
Academic Degrees & Graduate Education Reform Project of Henan Province
Major Project of Philosophical and Social Science in Henan Provincial Higher Education Institutions
Major Project of Basic Research on Philosophy and Social Sciences in Henan Provincial Higher Education Institutions