Sustainable Strategy Analysis: Platform Channel Configuration and Slotting Fee Design under Differentiated Quality Investment

Abstract

As a medium for matching supply and demand, platforms are changing industrial structures and consumption patterns to achieve sustainable operations. The platform establishes a self-operated channel on the basis of the present agent channel, which generates new conflicts and pollution problems. Considering the competition and quality investment, we investigate the platform’s optimal strategies, i.e., pricing, quality investment, channel format and slotting fee contract. The result shows that the platform adopting a dual channel structure contributes to sustainable operations because it can increase selling prices, sales volumes and consumers’ willingness when the channel introduction cost is lower. Meanwhile, the supplier always prefers the dual-channel structure because it can increase sales volume, profits and consumer surplus. Meanwhile, contrary to the commission rate, the emergence of competition promotes quality investment and guarantees consumer satisfaction. Under the intense channel conflicts, a variable slotting fee contract (VFC) is more profitable than a unit fixed slotting fee contract (UFC) owing to alleviating the competition; otherwise, the UFC has a larger improvement effect on profits. Meanwhile, with the increase in consumer quality sensitivity, UFC gradually cannibalizes VFC and occupies the core position in the operation.