SGXDump: A Repeatable Code-Reuse Attack for Extracting SGX Enclave Memory

Abstract

Intel SGX (Software Guard Extensions) is a hardware-based security solution that provides a trusted computing environment. SGX creates an isolated memory area called enclave and prevents any illegal access from outside of the enclave. SGX only allows executables already linked statically to the enclave when compiling executables to access its memory, so code injection attacks to SGX are not effective. However, as a previous study has demonstrated, Return-Oriented Programming (ROP) attacks can overcome this defense mechanism by injecting a series of addresses of executable codes inside the enclave. In this study, we propose a novel ROP attack, called SGXDump, which can repeat the attack payload. SGXDump consists only of gadgets in the enclave and unlike previous ROP attacks, the SGXDump attack can repeat the attack payload, communicate with other channels, and implement conditional statements. We successfully attacked two well-known SGX projects, mbedTLS-SGX and Graphene-SGX. Based on our attack experiences, it seems highly probable that an SGXDump attack can leak the entire enclave memory if there is an exploitable memory corruption vulnerability in the target SGX application.