The Green Development in Saline–Alkali Lands: The Evolutionary Game Framework of Small Farmers, Family Farms, and Seed Industry Enterprises

Abstract

Amid global climate change and population growth, the prevalence of saline–alkali lands significantly hampers sustainable agricultural development. This study employs theories of asymmetric information and bounded rationality to construct an evolutionary game model, analyzing the interactions among small farmers, family farms, and seed industry enterprises in the context of saline–alkali land management. It investigates the strategic choices and dynamics of these stakeholders under the influence of economic incentives and risk perceptions, with a focus on how government policies can foster green development. Utilizing Delay Differential Equations (DDEs) for simulations, this study highlights the risk of “market failure” without government intervention and underscores the need for government participation to stabilize and improve the efficiency of the green development process. The findings reveal that factors such as initial willingness to participate, the economic viability of salt-tolerant crops, seed pricing, research and development costs, and the design of incentive policies are crucial for sustainable land use. Accordingly, the paper proposes specific policy measures to enhance green development, including strengthening information dissemination and technical training, increasing the economic attractiveness of salt-tolerant crops, alleviating research and development pressures on seed companies, and optimizing economic incentives. This study provides a theoretical and policy framework for the sustainable management of saline–alkali lands, offering insights into the behavioral choices of agricultural stakeholders and supporting government strategies for agricultural and environmental protection.