A Resource Allocation Scheme with the Best Revenue in the Computing Power Network

Abstract

The emergence of computing power networks has improved the flexibility of resource scheduling. Considering the current trading scenario of computing power and network resources, most resources are no longer subject to change after being allocated to users until the end of the lease. However, this practice often leads to idle resources during resource usage. To optimize resource allocation, a trading mechanism is needed to encourage users to sell their idle resources. The Myerson auction mechanism precisely aims to maximize the seller’s benefits. Therefore, we propose a resource allocation scheme based on the Myerson auction. In the scenario of the same user bidding distribution, we first combine the Myerson auction with Hyperledger Fabric by introducing a reserved price, which creates conditions for the application of blockchain in auction scenarios. Regarding different user bidding distributions, we propose a Myerson auction network model based on clustering algorithms, which makes the auction adaptable to more complex scenarios. The experimental findings show that the revenue generated by the auction model in both scenarios is significantly higher than that of the traditional sealed bid second-price auction, and can approach the expected revenue in the real Myerson auction scenario.