Integrated Security Control for Nonlinear CPS with Actuator Fault and FDI Attack: An Active Attack-Tolerant Approach

Abstract

This paper investigated the co-design problem of less conservative integrated security control and communication for a nonlinear cyber-physical system (CPS) with an actuator fault and false data injection (FDI) attacks. Firstly, considering the efficient utilisation and allocation of computing and communication resources, an integrated framework was proposed from the perspective of active defence against FDI attacks. Secondly, the actuator fault and FDI attacks were augmented as a vector, and a robust observer was proposed to estimate the system state, actuator fault and FDI attacks. Furthermore, based on the obtained estimation results and the location of the FDI attack in the dual-end network, we designed an integrated security control strategy of active attack tolerance and active fault tolerance and, by constructing Lyapunov–Krasovskii functions and using time-delay system theory and the affine Bessel–Legendre inequality, a less conservative co-design method for integrated security control and network communication resource saving was developed. Finally, a simulation experiment of a quadruple tank was carried out to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method.