Research on Coordination of Fresh Supply Chain Considering Supplier Misreporting and Consumer Return

Author:

Lin Zhijun1ORCID,Chen Rui1,Luo Laijun2,Ren Haiping1

Affiliation:

1. Business School, Jiangxi University of Science and Technology, Nanchang 330013, China

2. School of Software Engineering, Jiangxi University of Science and Technology, Nanchang 330013, China

Abstract

Misreporting is prevalent in supply chain characterized by asymmetric information, and its impact on the supply chain is substantial and cannot be overlooked. In order to explore the impact of fresh supplier’s misreporting decisions on fresh supply chain, this paper takes the fresh supply chain with a single fresh supplier and a single e-commerce enterprise as the research object, and constructs five Stackelberg game models based on the differences of supply chain information transparency and power structure. Particularly, the effect of fresh-keeping level on the after-sales rate and market demand of the product is incorporated into the model, and the following conclusions are drawn by solving and analyzing the decision results of the different models: (1) When the supplier has the decision advantage, it will not choose to misreport. But when it loses the decision advantage, it will produce the misreporting behavior. Supplier misreporting is detrimental to the retailer and the supply chain; specifically, it can lead to lower fresh-keeping level and higher after-sales rates. (2) In the decentralized decision-making model, it is more beneficial for the supply chain that the supplier has the leading right of decision-making. In the absence of misreporting, the leader’s profit is always higher than that of the follower. When there is misreporting, even if the retailer is the dominant player, its profit is still lower than the manufacturer’s. (3) Both supply chain profit and fresh-keeping level are positively correlated with the coefficient of consumer perception of freshness and the coefficient of sensitivity to fresh-keeping technology, and are more significant under the centralized decision-making model. Furthermore, in response to supplier misreporting behavior, this paper achieves coordination in the fresh supply chain by designing a joint contract and confirms the effectiveness of this contract through an arithmetic analysis.

Funder

National Natural Science Foundation of China

Foundation of Jxust

Publisher

MDPI AG

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