Pharmaceutical Enterprises’ R&D Innovation Cooperation Moran Strategy When Considering Tax Incentives

Abstract

Drug R&D innovation contributes to the high-quality development of the pharmaceutical industry, which is related to people’s life and health, economic development, and social stability. Tax incentives and industry cooperation are conducive to promoting pharmaceutical enterprises’ innovation. Therefore, this paper constructs a Moran process evolutionary game model and analyzes the evolutionary trajectory of N pharmaceutical enterprises’ drug R&D innovation strategic choice and considers the choice of R&D innovation strategy and non-R&D innovation strategy. We obtain the conditions for the two strategies to achieve evolutionary stability under the dominance of external factors, the dominance of expected revenue, and the dominance of super expected revenue. The evolutionary process is simulated by MATLAB 2021b. The results show that, firstly, when the number of pharmaceutical enterprises is higher than a threshold, the market is conducive to pharmaceutical enterprises choosing an R&D innovation strategy. Secondly, the higher the tax incentives, the higher the probability of pharmaceutical enterprises choosing an R&D innovation strategy. Thirdly, when the R&D success rate increases, pharmaceutical enterprises gradually change from choosing a non-R&D innovation strategy to choosing an R&D innovation strategy. Fourthly, the threshold of strategy change of pharmaceutical enterprises is the same under the dominance of expected revenue and super expected revenue. This paper puts forward some countermeasures and suggestions for promoting the R&D innovation of pharmaceutical enterprises in practice.