Price Decision-Making in Dual-Channel Healthcare Services Supply Chain Considering the Channel Acceptance, Price Ceiling, and Public Welfare

Abstract

Given that an increasing number of online healthcare channels play an essential role as a supply method in the healthcare service supply chain (HSSC), this paper studies the price decision-making problem for a dual-channel HSSC considering the channel acceptance, price ceiling, and public welfare. In this HSSC, a healthcare institution establishes both a traditional offline channel and an online channel to provide healthcare services for some health conditions. Considering the public welfare of healthcare institutions, we employ a sum formula of economic revenue and patient surplus to describe the total revenue of both healthcare service channels. Based on the Stackelberg game, we develop a decentralized supply chain model to maximize supply chain members’ revenue. By employing the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker optimality condition, we derive an analytical expression for the optimal service price, which includes the functions of the public welfare coefficient and channel acceptance. Finally, we conduct extensive numerical analyses under various system parameters to verify the optimal price decision-making strategies. Our analytical results indicate that: (1) the healthcare service price is closely related to the patients’ channel acceptance, the public welfare coefficient, and the government price ceiling policy; (2) the public welfare coefficient strongly influences the service price and total revenue, and its increase can decrease the economic revenue of the HSSC; (3) the acceptance of online channels is an essential factor that should be carefully considered in the construction of a dual-channel HSSC. Improving patient acceptance of online channels is conducive to developing and improving a sustainable dual-channel HSSC.