A Signaling Game of Family Doctors and Residents from the Perspective of Personalized Contracted Service

Abstract

The role of the family doctor contracted service system in China’s medical and health system is increasing day by day. However, with the steady increase in contracting coverage, the phenomenon of “signing up but not contracting” has become common; to improve the current situation, the personalized signing service model has been strongly advocated. To promote the smooth implementation of the personalized contracted service model with family doctor competency as its core, this study used the signal game model to analyze the market equilibrium state of the signing service model. The results of this analysis reveal the following: (1) The camouflage of the number of contracts leads to distortion of the signal effect and to market failure, that is, the cost of competency camouflage is the primary factor affecting the equilibrium of contracted services. (2) The incompleteness of contracted services leads to quantity but not quality in the contracting market, that is, the payment of personalized service packages, the value-added utility of personalized services, and service gaps are the key factors that affect the decision-making behavior of the public. With this knowledge in mind, a compensation incentive mechanism that matches the competence level of the family doctor should be established, the formulation of contracted service agreements should be improved, and the participation of family doctors and residents should be encouraged, while the promotion of personalized contracted services should be enhanced and relevant supporting measures should be improved.