What If Keys Are Leaked? towards Practical and Secure Re-Encryption in Deduplication-Based Cloud Storage

Abstract

By only storing a unique copy of duplicate data possessed by different data owners, deduplication can significantly reduce storage cost, and hence is used broadly in public clouds. When combining with confidentiality, deduplication will become problematic as encryption performed by different data owners may differentiate identical data which may then become not deduplicable. The Message-Locked Encryption (MLE) is thus utilized to derive the same encryption key for the identical data, by which the encrypted data are still deduplicable after being encrypted by different data owners. As keys may be leaked over time, re-encrypting outsourced data is of paramount importance to ensure continuous confidentiality, which, however, has not been well addressed in the literature. In this paper, we design SEDER, a SEcure client-side Deduplication system enabling Efficient Re-encryption for cloud storage by (1) leveraging all-or-nothing transform (AONT), (2) designing a new delegated re-encryption (DRE), and (3) proposing a new proof of ownership scheme for encrypted cloud data (PoWC). Security analysis and experimental evaluation validate security and efficiency of SEDER, respectively.