A Comparative Study of Shame as Denoted by Hrī, Apatrāpya, and Xiuwuzhixin

Abstract

Mencius’ concept of shame has emerged as a space of comparison between shame cultures in the East and West in cross-cultural research. However, comparative research on shame in Buddhist and Confucian cultures is scarce. Hence, this study examines the Buddhist psychological Shame concepts of “hrī” (Can 慚, shame) and “apatrāpya” (Kui 愧, abashment) and the Confucian “xiuwuzhixin” (羞惡之心, the mind of shame) as representative examples that reveal a subject boundary that restricts shame to human beings and explores the similar subject-subordinate structures of these concepts. The study then analyzes the internal and external forces that induce shame. Finally, it discusses the goodness ascribed to shame and how deviation from shame leads to evil. Results reveal fundamental differences in the understanding of shame between the two cultures. In particular, “hrī” and “apatrāpya” in Buddhism are rooted in the psychological consciousness function, whereas “xiuwuzhixin” in Confucian culture is rooted in the ethics function. This cross-cultural comparison of shame highlights the tension and complexity inherent in this concept.