Research on Shared Logistics Decision Based on Evolutionary Game and Income Distribution

Abstract

As a green, efficient, and feasible solution, logistics resource sharing has received increasing attention in urban last-mile delivery. Instability in cooperation and unequal income distribution are significant constraints to logistics resource sharing. In this paper, we investigate the logistics resource sharing decision-making process among express delivery companies. First, according to the characteristics of the express delivery companies, symmetric and asymmetric game models based on evolutionary game theory are proposed, respectively. We examine the express delivery company’s choice of strategy and the major determinants of collaboration. Then, we examine the income distribution problem for subjects sharing logistics resources and propose an improved Raiffa solution that takes enterprise scale into account. Finally, certain management insights are offered for the express delivery companies to support the realization of logistics resource sharing. The results show that the evolution direction of the model is influenced by the initial state, enterprise scale, income distribution coefficient, and default penalty coefficient. Furthermore, the improved Raiffa solution takes into account the asymmetry of resource contribution of participating subjects and is more reasonable.