The Choice of Stock Ownership Structure: Agency Costs, Monitoring, and the Decision to Go Public-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

The Choice of Stock Ownership Structure: Agency Costs, Monitoring, and the Decision to Go Public

Published:1998-02-01 Issue:1 Volume:113 Page:187-225
ISSN:0033-5533
Container-title:The Quarterly Journal of Economics
language:en
Short-container-title:The Quarterly Journal of Economics

Author:

Pagano M.,Roell A.

Publisher

Oxford University Press (OUP)

Subject

Economics and Econometrics

Link

http://academic.oup.com/qje/article-pdf/113/1/187/5344970/113-1-187.pdf

Reference28 articles.

1. Barca, Fabrizio, Magda Bianco, Luigi Cannari, Riccardo Cesari, Carlo Gola, Giuseppe Manitta, Giorgio Salvo, and Luigi Signorini, Proprieta, modelli di controllo e riallocazione nelle imprese industriali italiane (Bologna, Italy: Il Mulino, 1994).

2. Bolton, Patrick, and Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, ``Blocks, Liquidity, and Corporate Control,'' Journal of Finance, LIII (1998), forthcoming.

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