Anaphor Binding: What French Inanimate Anaphors Show

Abstract

Owing to different ideas about what counts as an anaphor subject to Condition A, two influential but superficially incompatible versions of Condition A of binding theory have coexisted: Chomsky’s (1986) version, and versions of predicate-based binding theories defended by Pollard and Sag (1992) and Reinhart and Reuland (1993) and modified in various ways since ( Pollard 2005 , Reuland 2011 ). Using inanimate anaphors to independently control for sensitivity to Condition A without the confound of logophoricity, we show that Condition A must be checked at the syntax-interpretation interface and that Chomsky’s (1986) version (an anaphor must be bound within the smallest complete functional complex containing it and a possible binder) is nearly correct, with one amendment: a tensed TP boundary is opaque to the search for an antecedent. Given these results, we argue that Condition A should be reduced to phase theory and we outline how this can be done.