Abstract
Based on Kant’s political thought, this article deals with the relationship between a ruler’s power and freedom, law and morality. The assumed external freedom is to be guaranteed to individuals by a valid political authority (sovereign); however, the authorities do not have to obey the law, which means that the freedom of citizens is threatened. Thus, a tension appears between the freedom of the individual and obedience to an unjust law. From an authority’s perspective, peace is more important than moral development, and from a moral perspective, the rule of law is less important than ethical perfection. This leads to the question of whether revolutionary changes to the system can be justified on the basis of Kant’s assumptions, as some liberal interpretations of Kant’s thought propose. In this article, I argue that although the revolutionary moment is possible within Kant’s political philosophy, it is in a different place than most liberal authors point out and has no link to the common understanding of revolution.
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