The Two Faces of Freedom and Dignity: Credit or Extenuation

Abstract

In their 1989 refutation of Skinner's 1971 practical argument against the concepts of freedom and dignity, Harcum, Rosen, and Burijon overlooked an inconsistency in his argument which is based on the fact that society awards credit or blame because intentionality in prosocial and antisocial behaviors is assumed. By explaining antisocial behaviors in terms of environmental factors, science shows that the actor's behavior is not intentional, thereby reducing the amount of blame attributed to the actor and protecting his dignity. Because scientific progress in understanding antisocial behaviors protects or promotes the perception of human dignity instead of threatening it, Skinner's interpretation of why society opposes his behavioristic formulations is actually incorrect. The cultural value of beliefs in freedom and dignity, as agents of social progress, rather than barriers to it, is strongly affirmed.