Coalitional Behavior under the Condition of Risk

Abstract

Coalitional behavior under the risk condition of coalition success was investigated using male Ss in the triadic situation where A > B > C, A < (B + C). The results showed that under risk and potentially low conflict for power between partners, a coalition between A and B is most likely. The hypothesis that coalitions are equally likely was supported only when a potentially high power conflict between partners was present. The equity hypothesis that partners divide the payoff in proportion to their contribution to coalitional resources was supported when conflict for power was low. When the potential conflict was high, the stronger partner took advantage of it and the outcome was determined by the contest for power. The findings suggest that hypotheses about expected utility and equity provide powerful explanations of coalitional behavior under the condition of risk and when conflict for power among partners is low. The difference in coalitional behavior between situations of low and high conflict for power suggests that these situations should be distinguished in theoretical formulations. Suggestions for research are offered.